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THE PROPOSED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
SHOULD NOT BE ADOPTED
ALEXANDER HAMILTON FREY*

The primary reason why the proposed Uniform Arbitration Act
should not be adopted is because, by an express provision in section
1, the Act is made applicable to "arbitration agreements between
employers and employees or between their respective representatives."
My experience as an arbitrator has been confined almost exclusively
to labor disputes of which I have arbitrated hundreds. Consequently,
I do not purport to be able to judge whether or not the proposed
Act would be a valuable adjunct to the existing arbitration law in
the area of commercial arbitration. But I am convinced that, if
applied to labor arbitrations, the proposed Act would do much more
harm than good, and I believe that at least some of my specific
objections are equally applicable to commercial arbitrations.
DistinctionsBetween LaborArbitration
and CommercialArbitration
Able commentators have pointed out that there are three major factual distinctions underlying commercial arbitration on the one hand
and labor arbitration on the other.1 These are: (1) the business relations between the disputants in commercial arbitration are usually
over, and in all probability they will have no future dealings especially
in view of the unsatisfactory outcome of the transaction in dispute,
whereas the labor relations between the employer and his employees
or their representatives are a continuing process, and the parties must
surmount the temporary disagreement giving rise to a labor arbitration
and learn to live amicably together thereafter; (2) the matter in
dispute in commercial arbitration is usually an amount of money
measuring breach of contract or other alleged damages, whereas
the issues in labor arbitrations may involve numerous diverse matters,
many of which have little or no direct connection with money payments, e.g., job evaluation, employee discipline, seniority standards,
work assignments, leave of absence, union representation, etc.; (3)
the basic function of commercial arbitration is to establish a private
forum as a more expeditious substitute for a public trial, whereas
the function of labor arbitration is to extend the process of collective
*Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
1. See, e.g., Professor Robert L. Howard's excellent article entitled LaborManagement Arbitration: "There Ought To Be A Law"--Or Ought There?
21 Mo. L. REv. 1, 22-24 (1956).
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bargaining and to displace resort to economic force in the form of
strike or lock-out. These are highly significant distinctions between
commercial arbitration and labor arbitration, but it is not my present
purpose to belabor this point. My aim in the following pages is
to attempt to demonstrate that certain portions of the proposed Uniform Arbitration Act are potentially dangerous, if applied to labor
arbitrations. For a clear understanding of the ensuing discussion of
specific sections it is essential that the reader bear in mind, by way of
background, the interplay between voluntary labor arbitration, collective bargaining, and our cherished American system of freedom
of enterprise.
Labor Arbitration,Collective Bargainingand Free Enterprise
The essence of freedom of enterprise is that each person shall be
privileged to determine for himself the uses to which his property and
his labor shall be put. In a highly industrialized community such
as the United States, no one is completely self-sufficient. Each member
of our industrial society selects some specialty by which his property
or labor will be utilized to make a contribution to the total economic
product, and in return for which he will receive a portion of that composite product. But there has to be some device for determining how
much property or labor each specialist shall contribute and what he
shall receive in return. In the United States this is accomplished by
the process of bargaining. Day in and day out, in every corner of
the land, free men are negotiating, dickering, contracting, buying
and selling, leasing and renting, lending and borrowing-bargaining.
Out of this welter of bargaining comes food, clothing, shelter, health,
transportation, education, amusement, wealth, poverty, success, failure
-freedom of enterprise. The essence of our free enterprise system
is thus the bargaining process by which is determined what each shall
contribute to the welfare of the nation and what he shall receive in
return.
The perpetuation of this traditional system of private bargaining
is dependant upon virtually complete freedom from governmental
dictation as to the substantive terms that emerge from the bargaining
process. But the bargaining process, and this traditional freedom from
governmental intervention, is posited upon the existence of substantial equality of bargaining power between the participants. The
strength of the free enterprise system-the fairness of the bargaining
process as a national institution-presupposes a condition of giveand-take, i.e., that each of the bargaining adversaries has the capacity
to force the other to recede somewhat from the terms that he would
most prefer.
But from time to time it becomes apparent that a significant group
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of buyers or sellers does not have sufficient bargaining strength to
compel a fair return for that with which it parts. This may be due
to a lack of resources with which to withstand a deadlock, or because
monopolistic or monopsonistic conditions have emerged. But whatever the reason, when such conditions exist, the free enterprise system
is not fulfilling its function, a critical situation exists, and government
will surely intervene in an effort to ameliorate the lot of those who
cannot protect themselves from being imposed upon.
Such intervention may take either of two forms: The government
may invade the free enterprise system and by legislative fiat establish
certain economic terms instead of letting the uneven "bargaining"
process run its course; familiar examples are usury statutes, and rent
and price control laws during war-time emergencies. Or government
may seek to combat the crises by attempting to bring about substantial equality of bargaining power in an area where by hypothesis it
does not exist; this is illustrated by governmental efforts to break up
monopolies into smaller competing units so that potential buyers may
have several competing sellers with which to deal. Such endeavors
of government to establish bargaining conditions are entirely consistent with the maintenance of our free enterprise system, and are
much to be preferred, if a realistic choice exists, to governmental
invasion of this system by decreeing prices, rents, wages, etc.
It is generally agreed that ever since the Industrial Revolution there
has been a continuing increase in the percentage of unskilled and semiskilled industrial workers, and that an unskilled or semi-skilled
worker, acting alone, has no actual bargaining power as to the
terms or conditions of his employment. But by collective action
through unionization the essential elements of bargaining power can
be achieved. Despite this fact, progress toward this form of bargaining power for workers was extremely slow. In 1935, after fifty years
of existence, the American Federation of Labor had only three million members, and these were predominantly skilled craftsmen in
the building trades. Unskilled and semi-skilled factory workers were
virtually unorganized, and the inadequate buying power which they
were able to obtain for their services was seen to be an economic factor
of national concern, as the demand for factory products progressively
lagged behind the ever-increasing supply.
Faced with this crisis, Congress did not invade the free enterprise
system by establishing detailed regulations concerning terms and
conditions of employment, thus depriving employers and employees
alike of the privilege of negotiating these substantive provisions.
Instead the Congress sought to bring unorganized workers within
the free enterprise system by facilitating the development of labor
unions through which they might act collectively. The enactment
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of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 is comparable to the
passage of the Sherman Act in 1890. Both were significant legislative
efforts to defend and preserve the free enterprise system by attempting to provide for the acquisition of bargaining power by a substantial
segment of the citizenry confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it situation.
During the past two decades, due very largely to the operation
of the National Labor Relations Act, there has been a tremendous
increase in unionization, 2 especially among unskilled and semi-skilled
workers. Through organization for collective action they have achieved
a bargaining capacity that has made them a party to the philosophy
of the free enterprise system. The vast majority of workers can now
bargain collectively as to the terms and conditions of their employment. In any bargaining process the basic power of each party to
force concessions lies in his ability to refuse to do business on the
other fellow's terms. Suppose Smith wants to sell Blackacre to
Jones for not less than $10,000, and Jones wants to buy it from Smith
for not more than $8,000. Smith argues that Jones could not buy a
comparable piece of land for less than $11,000, and Jones replies that
Smith could not get more than $7,500 from any other buyer. If neither
is willing to recede from his position, what happens? Does the government step in and set a "fair" price at which Smith must sell and
Jones must buy? Certainly not. Smith and Jones part company and
each seeks a satisfactory deal elsewhere. After an interval of investigation and reflection, one or both may conclude that the other's
position was not entirely unreasonable, further negotiation may result, each may alter his original demand to some extent, and a bargain
may be reached.
In union-management bargaining the basic power of the parties is
essentially the same as that in the Smith-Jones negotiations. If an
impasse is reached, the workers in the bargaining unit may decide
in concert temporarily to withhold their services, i.e., to strike, or
the employer may decide temporarily to withhold job opportunities
from these workers as a body, i.e., to lock out. There are, however,
two major differences from the Smith-Jones situation. If Smith and
Jones do not reach an agreement, there are other potential buyers or
sellers with whom each may negotiate. But in a modern large-scale
manufacturing establishment if a thousand workers strike or are locked
out, they cannot as a united group find another employer, and the
2. It can be conservatively estimated that there are now in effect in the
United States approximately 100,000 collectively bargained agreements between unions and employers and that more than ninety percent of these agreements include a grievance procedure that terminates in arbitration. See
Warren and Bernstein, A Prolle of Labor Arbitration, 4 IND. & LAB. REL. REV.
200 (1951); Taylor, The Voluntary Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 49 MicH.

L. REv. 787 (1951).
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employer cannot find another body of employees. 3 Secondly, if Smith
and Jones do not agree, neither suffers a great detriment, but in a
strike or lock-out, the adverse effect on each side is tremendous: the
workers lose their total earnings for they cannot in the future sell
their present unexpended labor, and management's loss of profits and
of competitive position may be a staggering blow. Furthermore, in
many industries there is another danger of which both unions and
management are poignantly aware, and with which Smith and Jones
are not confronted. If a strike or a lock-out is prolonged, the resulting
loss in production may cause such a detriment to the public that the
government may find some basis for intervening and by governmental
flat decreeing the terms upon which labor relations between the
parties shall be resumed. This is the worst thing that can happen not
only to the employer and his unionized employees but also to the
public, for this is just as serious an invasion of freedom of enterprise
as if the government had dictated to Smith and Jones how much of
Blackacre must be conveyed and at what price.
For the reasons indicated above, in collective bargaining the pressure
upon both union and management for agreement is very great, and
yet each side is reluctant to resort to economic force, although without
at least the realistic threat of strike or lock-out neither may be inclined
to recede from a favored position. In many instances the consequence
is that, in order to avoid deadlocks, the parties incorporate into their
ultimate agreement provisions that both union and management quite
consciously realize are vague and uncertain. "No employee shall be
discharged except for just and reasonable cause." "In layoffs if skill
and ability are equal, seniority shall prevail." "Overtime shall be
apportioned among the employees on an equitable basis." By agreeing
upon such general propositions, and many others like them, the parties
avoid prolonged hasseling over specific situations, and deliberately
transform their agreement into a code of principles rather than a
legalistic contract such as a conveyance, lease, bill of sale, etc.
The use of such deliberate lack of precision and details as a device to
avoid strike or lock-out and the consequent danger of governmental
dictation could, of course, only postpone the evil day. Sooner or later
a situation will arise in which union and management are in adament
disagreement as to whether or not there was "just and reasonable"
cause for discharge, or skill and ability were "equal," or overtime had
been apportioned on an "equitable" basis. In the face of such an
impasse, strike and lock-out again come to the forefront. But, anticipating this very eventuality, labor and management today include
in the overwhelming majority of their agreements some provision for
3. The fact that a few strikers may be able to find temporary work and that
the employer may be able to hire a scattering of replacements does not alter
the essential correctness of this statement.
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arbitrating subsequent unresolved disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the terms of their agreement. 4 Viewed realistically, such arbitration is in effect a continuation of the collective
bargaining process. The arbitrator's award has the same binding
effect upon the parties, as if they themselves had formulated its terms
by negotiation and had incorporated them into an agreement between
them. Thus it appears that arbitration of labor grievances, like collective bargaining, is one of the bulwarks of the free enterprise system
without which there would be grave danger of "creeping socialism"
and the eventual establishment of a governmentally planned economy.
The ProposedAct Usurps the Right of the Disputantsto
Controlthe Selection of Their Arbitrator
To one who sincerely believes in the importance of labor arbitration
as an institution that contributes to the preservation of our American
system of free enterprise, section 3 of the proposed Act is especially
repugnant. This section reads as follows:
If the arbitration agreement provides a method of appointment of arbitrators, this method shall be followed. In the absence thereof, or if
the agreed method fails or for any reason cannot be followed, or when
an arbitrator appointed fails or is unable to act and his successor has not
been duly appointed, the court on application of a party shall appoint
one or more arbitrators. An arbitrator so appointed has all the powers
of one specifically named by the parties.
Labor arbitration is exclusively a consensual matter, and the danger
in this section is that it destroys the completely voluntary nature of
the arbitration process. Section 3 indefensibly discriminates against
unions and employers with respect to the extent to which they are
to be left free to agree or to disagree as a result of their exercise of
the traditional bargaining process. In the first place, this section
stipulates that if the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement without providing a method of appointment of arbitrators, "the
court on application of a party shall appoint one or more arbitrators."
I assume that people do not just agree to arbitrate, without any reference to the process of selecting the arbitrator, and that therefore
when this section refers to the "absence" of a method of appointment
of arbitrators, the draftsmen are referring to the absence of a conclusive or definitive method. It so happens that from time to time
in collective bargaining negotiations one of the parties (or possibly
both) is faced for the first time with the idea of arbitrating grievances,
and, while willing to agree in principle to such arbitration, is unwilling
to venture too far out on this untried limb. So the parties agree on a
4. See note 2 supra.
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limited arrangement that they call arbitration, viz., that in the event
of an unresolved grievance each party shall designate an arbitrator
and these two shall endeavor to agree upon an unpartial third, with
the unexpressed understanding that if the two arbitrators cannot
agree upon a third, the arrangement fails and they are right back
where they would have been, if they had not included any provision
for arbitration in their agreement.
If I understand section 3, in the event that the two arbitrators become deadlocked over the selection of a third, either party can apply
to a judge 5 and have him appoint an arbitrator who would have the
same powers as if he had been named by the parties or by the arbitrators designated by them. This is a horrendous invasion of freedom
of contract, where, as in my hypothetical case, the intent of the
parties was that there should be no arbitration unless the two designated arbitrators were able to agree upon a third. Even if we assume that the failure of the parties expressly to provide a definitive
method of selecting an impartial third arbitrator was inadvertent
and not deliberate, the state has no right, especially at the request
of only one of the parties, to attempt to counteract a defect (but not
a reformable mistake) in their agreement.
Moreover, arbitration is purely voluntary-it is not a process that
the parties have to agree to-and arbitration without an arbitrator
is impossible. Hence, if in their "agreement" they have not voluntarily agreed upon an arbitrator, or at least upon a sure procedure for
selecting him, they have not in reality entered into an arbitration
agreement. If Smith and Jones sign an instrument in which Smith
agrees to sell and Jones agrees to buy Blackacre at a price to be thereafter mutually agreed upon, have they entered into an enforceable
agreement to buy and sell Blackacre? At most they have agreed to
try to agree upon a price, and if they try and fail, they have carried
out their undertaking. Should we authorize by statute either party
to apply to a judge for the appointment of a Master to decree a price
at which they must buy and sell Blackacre? An alleged agreement
to arbitrate without provision for the definite selection of an arbitrator
is illusory, and is not in legal contemplation an agreement to arbitrate.
This portion of section 3 is therefore paradoxical. By its express terms
it is applicable only to "arbitration agreements," and yet the very condition that is a sine qua non to invoking this portion of the section,
namely, the failure of the parties to designate an arbitrator, or a
definitive process for selecting him, precludes the transaction from
5. Section 18 of the proposed Uniform Arbitration Act provides that "An
initial application shall be made to the court of the (county) in which the
agreement provides the arbitration hearing shall be held. Otherwise the
application shall be made in the (county) where the adverse party resides
or has a place of business or, if he has no residence or place of business in this
State, to the court of any (county)."
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being an arbitration agreement, and consequently leaves nothing upon
which this portion of the section can operate.
The next portion of section 3 deals not with those situations in which
the parties fail to agree upon an arbitrator but with situations in which
the agreed method does result in the designation of an arbitrator, but
for some reason he will not or cannot serve. Here again the proposed
Act authorizes a judge upon application of one of the parties to appoint an arbitrator. The most fundamental situation to which this
portion of section 3 is applicable is that in which the parties agree upon
X as arbitrator and with his consent name him in the agreement for
its duration. X serves as arbitrator for several months and then dies.
If the arbitration agreement contains no provision for this contingency,
the death of X terminates the agreement. Should the parties be able
to agree on another arbitrator, they will thereby enter into a new
arbitration agreement, but if they cannot agree on an arbitrator, their
arbitration venture is over, at least for the time being.
Yet section 3 says that in such a situation "the court on application
of a party shall appoint one or more arbitrators." It is hard to imagine
a more drastic interference with freedom of contract and freedom of
appointment. The parties may have anticipated that during the life
of their contract they would have various disagreements over the
operation of a new job evaluation plan about to be installed. So they
jointly designated X as arbitrator because he was a recognized expert
on matters of job evaluation. And yet, upon X's death, section 3 would
empower a court upon request of only one of the parties to appoint a
successor to X who may know little or nothing about job evaluation.
During the war one of the cases I mediated for the War Labor Board
involved a prolonged dispute between a multi-plant corporation and
a union representing the employees at one of the plants over the
union's demand that the terminal step in the grievance procedure
should be a stipulated arbitration provision. The corporation's position was that it was opposed as a matter of principle to arbitration.
Finally the corporation offered to accept the grievance procedure desired by the union if the union would agree to accept Mr. M., the corporation's executive vice-president, in its main office, as the arbitrator,
and the dispute was settled on this basis. The union representatives
explained to me that while they regarded this as a spurious form of
arbitration, nevertheless they felt they had achieved an important
forward step because the union had been seeking for years to acquire
the right to appeal to the main office from certain decisions of local
management. If during the life of this agreement Mr. M. had died or
retired, it would completely transform the original intention of both
parties to the agreement, if a court were to appoint as a successor
to Mr. M. a complete stranger to the corporation; and yet this is what
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could happen, if the union invoked section 3 of the proposed Act.
Perhaps the proponents of this section will concede that the section
may result in the parties to an abortive arbitration agreement being
compelled to accept as an arbitrator a person not agreed to by at least
one of them, but will argue that such "compulsory arbitration" is
preferable as a matter of public policy to strikes and lock-outs, the only
alternate methods of resolving labor disputes. But since arbitration
is a consensual matter, "compulsory arbitration" is a contradiction in
terms. If there be those who believe that the public interest demands
that government be authorized to dictate to both unions and management the terms upon which labor disputes must be settled, let them
openly advocate this and not employ a phoney "arbitration" device as
an entering wedge. Certainly, if the state is to be authorized to brush
aside the freedom of enterprise of some labor disputants, there is no
justification for applying this compulsion only to those unions and
managements that happen to have negotiated an ineffective attempt
to arbitrate.
Finally, as far as section 3 is concerned, its phraseology is confusing.
For instance, it says that "when an arbitrator appointed fails to act,"
and his successor has not been "duly appointed," the court "shall appoint" one or more arbitrators. Does this mean that the court has no
discretion under the indicated circumstances, and in response to an
ex parte application must appoint an arbitrator (or any number of
them), even though at the time the other party may be seeking in good
faith to negotiate as to the selection of a new arbitrator? Surely if
a court is to be given such power, the statute should spell out (as in
the Norris-La Guardia Act) the procedures to be followed and the
facts to be found by the court as a condition to the exercise of the
power.
The Proposed Act Undermines the Completely Voluntary Nature
of Labor Arbitration
My initial comments have been directed to section 3 because the
most important element in any arbitration proceeding is the selection
of the arbitrator. There are, however, other portions of the proposed
Act that are almost equally, although perhaps less manifestly, objectionable. Section 2(a) reads as follows:
On application of a party showing an agreement described in Section 1,
and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the Court shall order the
parties to proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party denies the
existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the Court shall proceed summarily
to the determination of the issue so raised and shall order arbitration if
found for the moving party, otherwise, the application shall be denied.
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This section vividly demonstrates that the draftsmen of the proposed Act were essentially concerned with the problems of commercial
arbitration, and that they were either unaware of or ignored the basic
distinctions between commercial arbitration and labor arbitration,
when they stipulated that the Act should be equally applicable to both.
As pointed out heretofore, commercial arbitration is usually a oneshot affair between the parties. They cannot exert economic force
upon one another in an effort to induce compliance. Their only recourse is to a forum in which a decision will be rendered in favor of
one party or the other. They conceive of arbitration as a quasi-judicial
proceeding, differing from a lawsuit only in that the outcome is
speedier; they can pick their own umpire (he will usually be far more
familiar with the workings of the industry and its problems than the
average judge); and they can stipulate as to the standards to be applied
in resolving the dispute.
Labor arbitration, on the other hand, is but one phase of a continuing
relationship between the parties. When a business bargains collectively with its employees the objective of both employer and union
is to establish a pseudo-government for their industrial community
with their own constitution (trade agreement), their own legislature
(committee structure) and their own judiciary (the arbitration
process). If problems arise within this industrial framework, the
parties traditionally prefer to settle them in their own way and do
not want courts or other organs of government to intervene. So long
as the bargaining powers of the union and of the employer are relatively equal, they will settle their irreconcilable differences by resort
either to economic force or to arbitration. Neither side will institute
court proceedings against the other for alleged breach of contract.
A lawsuit is the last resort of a union or employer where one or the
other has become so weak that the conditions for collective bargaining
are unfavorable. The effect of such a suit is to worsen the already
frayed relations between the parties, and realistic collective bargaining
is likely to terminate until one side or the other is substantially reorganized.
Preliminary to a discussion of the fundamental objection to section
2 (a) it should be noted that the term "refusal to arbitrate" needs
clarification. Let us return to the situation in which union and employer have agreed to arbitrate grievances concerning the interpretation and application of their contract, and that the stipulated process
for selecting the arbitration board is for each party to name an
arbitrator and for those two to agree upon a third. Suppose the union
asserts a grievance and the employer refuses to name an arbitrator.
Is this a "refusal to arbitrate" to which section 2 (a) is applicable, or
is this a situation in which "the agreed method fails" and to which
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section 3 concerning the appointment of arbitrators is applicable? If
the former, then the court acting under section 2 (a) might order the
employer to appoint an arbitrator. Thereafter, if the employer complies, the two arbitrators may not be able to agree upon a third. Then
proceedings would have to be instituted under section 3 to obtain
from a court (not necessarily the same court) the appointment of a
third arbitrator. Let us suppose that now the recalcitrant employer
refuses to appear or participate in any way in the hearing called by
the board. Is this a "refusal to arbitrate" to which section 2 (a) is
applicable? One would suppose so, except for the provision in section
5 that "the arbitrators may hear and determine the controversy upon
the evidence produced notwithstanding the failure of a party duly
notified to appear."
If the employer is still determined not to subject himself to an arbitration award concerning the issue raised by the union, at this point
he would apply to a court, under section 2 (b), to "stay" the proceedings. Section 2 (b) says that "on application, the court may stay an
arbitration proceeding commenced or threatened on a showing that
there is no agreement to arbitrate." The employer might now claim
that the issue raised by the union is not arbitrable, i.e., that there is no
agreement to arbitrate this issue. If the court grants the employer's
motion for a "stay," the union is entitled, under section 19 (2) of the
Act, to take an appeal. Incidentally, the Act provides no right of
appeal from a court order compelling a party to proceed with arbitration. If the union wins on appeal and the "stay" is set aside, the arbitrators may proceed to a hearing and award. But even if the award
is in favor of the union, the employer is not done yet. He may apply
to a court to vacate the award, and section 12 enumerates six grounds
upon which an award may be vacated by court order. Among these
are such potentially controversial matters as that the award was
procured by "undue means," that among the arbitrators there was
"misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party," that the arbitrators
so conducted the hearing "as to prejudice substantially the rights of
a party," and that "the arbitrators exceeded their authority." This last
is not necessarily identical with, but can be very closely related to, the
issue of arbitrability. If the motion to vacate the award is granted,
the union is entitled, under section 19 (5) to appeal, and if the court
refuses to vacate the award, it is required, under section 12 (d) to
"confirm" the award, and under section 19 (3) the employer may appeal
from this confirmation of the award. If the court vacates the award
and this is sustained on appeal, the court may under most of the circumstances set forth in section 12 (a) order a rehearing before new
arbitrators, and the merry-go-round begins again.
This complex and cumbersome procedure is utterly inappropriate
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to labor arbitration. In almost twenty years of arbitrating I have
never known one of the parties to a labor arbitration agreement simply
to refuse to abide by the agreement. The refusal to arbitrate a given
matter is invariably accompanied by an explanation. At times it is
alleged that the required antecedent steps in the grievance procedure
have not been followed, or that the claim has not been asserted within
the stipulated time limit, or that the same matter has been conclusively
determined in a previous case. But most frequently the reason assigned
for a refusal to arbitrate is that the issue raised is not arbitrable, i.e.,
that the dispute does not concern the interpretation and application
of the terms of the agreement between the parties and therefore is not
within the scope of the arbitration agreement. How should such a controversy be settled?
Ideally, in the arbitration provision of the grievance procedure the
parties should spell out the method to be followed when the arbitrability of an asserted grievance is questioned. Occasionally, an arbitration agreement expressly stipulates that if arbitrability is questioned this issue shall be subjected to a specified arbitration procedure.
But the vast majority of arbitration agreements are silent as to this
contingency. Where an arbitration agreement does not provide either
expressly or by reasonable implication how an issue of arbitrability is
to be settled, it is to this extent defective. I do not believe that an
arbitrator who has been authorized by the parties only to render
awards within a defined area of substantive disputes has the right,
without the mutual consent of the parties, to resolve procedural conflicts concerning his own jurisdiction. Here again there is no agreement to arbitrate. The parties have in effect said that the arbitration
procedure they establish is to apply only to those issues which they
jointly accept as arbitrable, and to no others. How can their fragmentary agreement legitimately be construed otherwise, and so construed,
by what constitutional authority may a court order a person to carry
out his "voluntary" agreement to arbitrate, when this forces him to
go beyond that to which he has agreed? And yet section 2 (a) of the
proposed Uniform Arbitration Act says that, if a person has denied
the existence of an agreement to arbitrate a specific issue, the court
many nevertheless order him to arbitrate that issue. This is a gross
violation not only of the principle of freedom of contract but also of
the bargaining process upon which the free enterprise system is
founded.
One may well suggest that the foregoing analysis provides a party
to a bona fide arbitration agreement with an opportunity to avoid his
obligation to arbitrate a grievance that is clearly within the terms of
the agreement merely by capriciously contending that the grievance
is not an arbitrable one. Theoretically this is possible, but practically
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it is not. The assumed situation amounts to a flagrant and deliberate
breach of a portion of the union-employer agreement, and the outcome
would be no different from that which would result from a similar
breach of any other significant provision in the collectively bargained
contract. This would depend on the economic strength of the respective parties. If the union was the victim, if it regarded the employer's
conduct as a serious repudiation of collective bargaining, and if it was
prepared to risk its economic power, it might strike, contending that
the employer's repudiation of his obligation released the employees
from a no-strike clause, if such existed. If the union did not feel
inclined to strike, it might charge the employer with a violation of
section 8 (a) (5) (breach of duty to bargain collectively) of the National Labor Relations Act, it might seek specific performance of the
contract provision under section 301 (a) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, or it might invoke common law remedies for breach
of contract. The draftsmen of the proposed Uniform Arbitration Act
offer no explanation as to why the arbitration segment of a collectively
bargained agreement should be singled out for a special statutory
treatment not applicable to the other portions of the agreement.
If the refusal to arbitrate is not a deliberate breach but based upon
a sincere belief that the asserted grievance is not within the scope of
the arbitration agreement, the situation is vastly different. In a typical
union-employer agreement, practically all the obligations are those of
management. Hence the grievance procedure including arbitration
deals almost exclusively with claims asserted by the union on behalf
of employees against the employer. Employers do not have to agree to
arbitration as the eventual solution of such unresolved grievances any
more than they have to agree to a month's paid vacation for every
employee. The fact that at least ninety percent of all union-employer
agreements today provide for some form of arbitration as the terminal
point in the grievance procedure demonstrates that both unions and
employers have concluded that it is to their mutual advantage to settle
these disputes in this way rather than by resort to economic force or
to judicial proceedings.
When a union sincerely believes that it is contractually entitled to
have a given dispute arbitrated, and when the employer with equal
sincerity believes the union's demand for arbitration oversteps the
agreed boundary, this is no occasion for a strike or a lock-out or for
injecting a court or an administrative agency into the relations between the parties. Where, as assumed, there is good faith on both
sides, the procedure in reality is that the parties negotiate, and in
practically every such case one side or the other abandons its contention as to arbitrability, or both agree to submit the issue of arbitrability
to arbitration. Where I have been named by the parties as an arbitrator

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 10

of grievances, I have often been confronted by an employer's initial
contention that the asserted grievance is not arbitrable, but I have
never been involved in a case in which the employer refused to submit
this issue to arbitration. Usually, although not always, the parties,
after vigorously presenting their respective arguments on the matter
of arbitrability, will authorize me to reserve my judgment on this
issue, and will proceed at the same hearing to present their respective
cases on the underlying substantive grievance.
Thus far I have sought to emphasize that a statutory procedure for
the compulsory appointment of an arbitrator in a labor dispute or for
compelling arbitration of a labor dispute is either an invasion of freedom of contract, or is unnecessary, or both. There are two other major
drawbacks to such a statute. First, the very existence of such an available procedure tempts its use. For the maintenance of high morale
and sound labor relations there is no substitute for the travail of
painstaking, persistent, forthright collective bargaining between
unions and employers. Even a prolonged strike or lock-out at times
clears the air and for an indefinite period thereafter induces a greater
degree of reasonableness on both sides. During the war collective
bargaining languished because one side or the other in contract negotiations would speed the dispute to the War Labor Board. The Railway
Labor Act has had a blighting effect upon real collective bargaining
in the railway industry. Most of the court cases involving attempts
to enforce labor arbitrations have arisen in states like New York that
have arbitration statutes similar to the proposed Uniform Arbitration
Act.6 Labor arbitration is part of the process of collective bargaining,
and it is just as important that the parties should be left alone to
thrash out among themselves their disagreements over arbitration
procedures, as it is that they should be unconstrained in any other
area of the collective bargaining process.
Secondly, the "voluntary" aspect of labor arbitration is frequently
completely destroyed when a court determines the arbitrability of a
given grievance, because in many instances it is impossible to separate
this issue from the substantive issue, which by agreement of the parties
was to be decided, if at all, by an arbitrator of their own choosing. To
illustrate let us assume a union-employer contract that contains, inter
alia, the following not uncommon provisions: the bargaining unit
includes all production and maintenance employees except supervisors; all members of the bargaining unit "shall become and remain
members of the Union on the thirtieth day following the beginning
of such employment, or the effective date of this contract, whichever
6. "Many have inclined to the judgment that the presence of a statute in
New York over a period of many years with its numerous bases for court
intervention, in effect inviting resort to the courts by any disgruntled party,
is largely responsible for the unfortunate experience in this regard in that
state." Howard, supra note 1, at 20.
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is later, all to be enforced and applied in accordance with the provisions of section 8 (a) (3) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947, as amended"; a grievance procedure limited to matters concerning the interpretation and application of the contract, the final step
in this procedure being arbitration; B.A. Jones with his acquiescence is
named in the contract as the sole arbitrator. Let us further assume
that a month after the effective date of this contract the union demands
that employee, F. T. Root, be discharged because he has not paid any
initiation fee or dues to the union and hence is not a member of the
union as required by the union shop provision. The employer refuses
to comply on the ground that Root is a supervisor, and that therefore
he is not a member of the bargaining unit and not subject to the provisions of the contract. The union replies that the actual work that
Root has been doing is that of a production worker and not a supervisor. After the preliminary stages of the grievance procedure fail
to produce agreement, the union submits the matter to B.A. Jones. The
company notifies the union that, if Jones sets a time and place for a
hearing, it will not appear before him with respect to this matter,
because the grievance procedure applies only to members of the bargaining unit, and since Root is a supervisor, the issue raised by the
union is not within the scope of the arbitration provision in the contract, and hence Jones has no jurisdiction over this dispute.
Under section 2 of the proposed Uniform Arbitration Act, in the
foregoing situation the union might apply to a court for an order directing the employer to proceed with arbitration, and the employer
might apply for an order staying arbitration. If the employer, instead
of asserting non-arbitrability, had concurred with the union in presenting the grievance concerning employee Root to arbitrator Jones
for determination, the issue before Jones would have been whether
with respect to the union shop provision Root's job was that of a
production worker or a foreman. If a court undertakes to determine
the issue of arbitrability, it cannot divorce this question from the
question of Root's status. The court will have to hear testimony as to
the exact nature of Root's work and interpret and apply the contract
terms "production worker" and "supervisor" in the light of this testimony. But the parties have agreed that only arbitrator Jones is to
interpret and apply the terms of their contract. Whether the court
ultimately decides that the issue is arbitrable or that it is not arbitrable, in either case it will in effect be deciding the underlying substantive issue, thereby usurping the contractual function of arbitrator
Jones, and leaving nothing for him to decide even if the employer is
ordered to proceed with arbitration. Any person familiar with labor
arbitration will readily picture many other situations similar to the
foregoing illustration, in which a court, in the guise of merely settling
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a procedural issue as to arbitrability, will actually be passing upon
the substantive factual issue involved in the union's alleged grievance.
Many judges are less competent to deal with complex issues of labor
relations than experienced arbitrators chosen by the parties, and
where statutes impose this decision-making function upon the courts,
the results are often deplorable. 7
The ProposedAct Hampers the Arbitrator
By LegalisticProceduralRequirements
The objectionable features of the proposed Uniform Arbitration Act
as applied to labor arbitration are not limited to the respects indicated
above in which it invades the freedom of contract of unions and
employers and destroys the essential voluntary aspect of labor arbitration as an institution. It goes so far as to dictate to the arbitrator
the manner in which he shall conduct himself. Section 5 requires
arbitrators to serve notice "personally or by registered mail" upon
the parties of the time and place of the hearing "not less than five
days before the hearing." I have never "served" a notice of hearing
upon either party. Such notice is invariably given by an ordinary
letter or by telephone. Although labor arbitrators insist upon a reasonable degree of order and decorum at the hearing, they seek to
avoid the formality of a courtroom, and they would be loathe to begin
the proceedings by creating the atmosphere of distrust that the use
of registered mail or formal service implies.
Frequently, in a labor arbitration hearing no lawyers are present:
often the arbitrator is not a lawyer, and the union's case is presented
by a union officer and the company's by a company official. In any
event, the legal rules of evidence are not applicable to the presentation
of testimony. But section 5 (b) projects a legalistic note into the proceedings by stipulating that "The parties are entitled to be heard, to
present evidence material to the controversy and to cross-examine
witnesses appearing at the hearing." Section 7 gives the arbitrator
power to subpoena not only witnesses but also books, records, documents, and other evidence, and provides for the taking of depositions.
This section even goes so far as to legislate that witnesses at labor
arbitrations shall be entitled to the same fees as witnesses in court.
Section 8 provides that the arbitrator shall deliver a copy of the
award to each party "personally or by registered mail." It is not my
custom to send awards out by registered mails, and I think the parties
with whom I deal would be somewhat indignant, if I did. This section
also authorizes a court, upon application of one of the parties, to fix
the time within which the arbitrator shall make his award, if a time
7. Cf. Mayer, Judicial "Bulls" in the Delicate China Shop of Labor Arbitration, 2 LAB. L. J. 502 (1951), and Arbitration and the Judicial Sword of Damocles, 4 LAB. L.J. 723 (1953).
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limit is not set forth in the arbitration agreement. Does this mean that
the arbitrator will be in danger of being penalized for contempt of
court, if he does have his award ready by the date set by the court?
Labor arbitrators, as a whole, are extremely diligent and conscientious
persons, who are at least as interested in the public service aspect of
their work as in any fee that may be involved. In fact, labor arbitrators
are constantly seeking, by the manner in which they conduct hearings
and write opinions, to bring about better relations between the parties,
thus minimizing the need for their services in the future. Labor arbitration is an art, and the less the parties and the arbitrator are surrounded by artificial requirements and restrictions, the finer the
product can be.
Sections 12 and 13 are probably the most baneful portions of the
proposed Act. These sections authorize courts to vacate, modify or
correct arbitrators' awards. One of the essential elements of arbitration is that the award of the arbitrator is final and binding upon the
parties. But section 12 of the proposed Act materially weakens this
basic principle by empowering a judge to vacate an award on such
vague and controversial grounds as fraud, corruption, undue means,
evident partiality, prejudicial misconduct, and that the arbitrator
exceeded his powers.
Despite the high esteem I have for labor arbitrators, I, of course,
recognize that they may make mistakes, and that some may occasionally even be guilty of fraud. However rare such occurrences may
be, is it not well to guard against their happening by formulating
grounds upon which, on appeal, courts may set aside an arbitrator's
award? I think not. The fraud, corruption, misconduct, etc. provisions
have little or no applicability to labor arbitrations. For example, let
us suppose that an arbitrator accepts a bribe in a discharge case and
directs the employer to reinstate the discharged employee with full
back pay. If the employer discovers the fraud promptly, he will refuse
to carry out the award, and the union will not seek the aid of any
sheriff to enforce it. If he discovers the fraud after having complied
with the award, the employer would probably re-discharge the employee and demand from him a return of the back pay. In this case,
and in most instances, self-help is more effective than an appeal to a
court to vacate the award.
Next let us suppose that an honest arbitrator is induced to make an
erroneous award because of the false testimony of a corrupt witness.
On the basis of after-discovered evidence an arbitrator will re-open
the hearing and subsequently may even revoke his award. If the
corruption were discovered by the employer before he had carried
out the award, he would seek in this way to have the award vacated
rather than resort to judicial proceedings. If he had already put
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the award into effect, the employer's conduct upon subsequently discovering the fraud would depend on the nature of the circumstances.
If the arbitrator, in reliance on false testimony, had awarded an
increase in an incentive rate, the employer might reduce the rate to
his former figure, but I doubt that he would demand from his employees a return of the excess, and I am sure he would not seek court
help.
Of all the enumerated grounds for vacating an award, the one that
is potentially the most dangerous to labor arbitration as an institution
is the charge that the arbitrator exceeded his powers. I assume that
this charge relates primarily either to the action of an arbitrator in
asserting jurisdiction over an allegedly non-arbitrable matter, or the
action of an arbitrator in setting forth an allegedly unauthorized remedy or sanction in his award. I have already discussed the undesirability of authorizing courts to determine issues of arbitrability in labor
matters,8 and I shall confine myself at this point to appeals concerning
the propriety of the awarded remedy or sanction.
In the arbitration of a typical discharge case the union claims that
the discharge of the employee was not for just cause and demands his
reinstatement with full back pay, while the employer contends that
the discharge was completely justified and should not be disturbed.
After studying the record of the hearing, the arbitrator might conclude
that the employee had been somewhat at fault but his misconduct was
not so gross as to merit the supreme penalty of discharge, and in such
an event the arbitrator's award might be that the employee shall be
reinstated but without back pay. Has the arbitrator in rendering such
an award exceeded his powers? Upon application of either the union
or the employer would section 12 (a) (3) of the proposed Act authorize
a court to vacate the award on the ground that the arbitrator's power
was limited to an all-or-nothing decision? If the court vacates the
award on this ground, will the court not be relying on the same facts
and applying the same standards as those with which the arbitrator
was confronted, and will not the court merely be substituting its conclusion for that of the arbitrator designated by the parties?
It is my practice, in discharge cases such as the above, to question
the parties at the outset of the hearing as to the extent on my authority, i.e., whether I am limited to an all-or-nothing decision, or whether
I may substitute a lesser penalty for discharge, if in my judgment this
should be the appropriate decision. This at times provokes quite a
little discussion among the representatives of the parties culminating
in a special stipulation one way or the other (almost always both
parties at once concede that the arbitrator has the broader remedial
power). I am firmly convinced that my query arises out of an excess
8. See pp. 719-24 supra.
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of caution, and that it is inherent in the power of an arbitrator to
select, within reasonable limits, the remedy which he regards as most
appropriate when he determines that an arbitrable wrong has occurred, unless the parties by mutual agreement have specified the
remedy.
The very existence of a statute whereby the power of a labor arbitrator to decree a remedy may be challenged is undesirable. An
arbitrator is usually an expert in labor relations, and the manner in
which he exercises his power in a given situation is part of the art
of arbitration. Occasionally he may merely mediate, at times he may
conclude that a cautious, almost legalistic approach is indicated, on
other occasions he may sense that a novel award may contribute most
to the future labor relations of the parties. Some time ago I arbitrated
a discharge case in which I concluded that the employee had been
at fault but not sufficiently so to justify his discharge. My award was
that he should be reinstated with full back pay, but with a loss of four
years seniority. In selecting this penalty I had a very special reason.
I was in effect remedying a situation that was only collateral to the
instant grievance. All concerned were well satisfied with the outcome,
but I am not sure that I would have ventured to impose this novel
penalty if there had been danger of a statutory appeal therefrom.
An arbitration award, like any portion of a contract, can always be
modified or even rejected by mutual consent of the parties, and in labor
relations if an arbitrator is deemed to have overstepped the mark, the
parties themselves will usually take care of the situation. Several
years ago I arbitrated a case involving a large manufacturing corporation, the representatives of which insisted upon a strict interpretation
of the contract provision that the arbitrator was not to add to, subtract
from, or otherwise modify the agreement of the parties. The contract
provided that when layoffs occurred, they should be made in accordance with departmental seniority. The company had laid off six men
in a given department. The first five were unquestionably those with
the least seniority. The sixth man, A, had been hired on the same day
as B, and as far as the company's records revealed, their seniority was
identical. The company had laid off A because it regarded B as a more
efficient employee. The union contended that the company had violated the contract provision requiring layoffs to be based exclusively
on departmental seniority, and that the purpose of this strict provision
was to eliminate discretion, e.g., a resort to alleged superior efficiency,
as a factor in layoff. My award was that the company had violated
the contract, and I directed that a decision should be made by lot
between A and B as to which should have been laid off last, and that
if A won he should receive back pay from the time of his layoff until
he was returned to work. The company asked for a re-hearing at which
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it conceded that I was correct in finding that it had not proceeded in
strict accordance with the seniority provision, which would have
required it to lay off both A and B or neither, but the company insisted
that I had exceeded my authority, because there was no provision in
the contract for breaking ties by drawing lots, and that by directing
the use of this method I was adding to the contract. The company did
not object to the tie-breaking method I proposed (it had been used
informally for other purposes such as settling conflicts concerning
vacation periods), but it wanted to safeguard against my decision
establishing a precedent concerning the power of an arbitrator to
add to the contract. So at the re-hearing the representatives of the
corporation and of the union executed a special stipulation authorizing
me, in the event my decision was in favor of the union, to direct the
method of breaking seniority ties for layoff purposes. The parties
then returned to me their copies of my original award and opinion,
and after altering the statement of facts to include the special stipulation, I reissued the same award and opinion. If, in this instance, there
had been an applicable statute such as section 12 of the proposed Uniform Arbitration Act, the corporation might have availed itself of it,
in which event the union would have been angered, I would have been
chagrined, and the arbitration process would have been impaired.
The procedure actually adopted by the company not only avoided
these hazards while accomplishing its objective, but also to some extent improved the atmosphere. I have been called on by the parties to
arbitrate several subsequent cases, and I think we are all a bit more
relaxed because of this earlier experience.
Some of the most awkward problems with which a labor arbitrator
is confronted are those in which there is a violation of the contract but
no express or implied indication as to the remedy for the violation in
question. For example, the contract provides that in the event of a
proposed layoff the employer shall supply the union forty-eight hours
in advance with a list of the employees to be laid off. This provision
is of importance to the union so that it may have an adequate opportunity to check the layoff list against the seniority list and assure
itself that the correct employees will be laid off, or avoid subsequent
difficulties by pointing out discrepancies. The union takes a case to
arbitration in which it alleges that the employer violated the contract
by laying off a number of employees without giving the union the
required advance notice. The employer does not deny this, but contends that the correct employees were laid off, that therefore no damage resulted from the technical breach of the contract, and that
consequently the arbitrator is powerless to prescribe any sanction. If
the employees were still on layoff, it is conceivable that the arbitrator
might direct the employer to recall them to work, and to adhere
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strictly to the contract requirement in any subsequent layoff. Under
section 12 of the proposed Act would a court be justified in vacating
this award? Incidentally, if under section 12 a court should vacate
an award on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded his powers
in decreeing a specific sanction, the court may order a rehearing before
the same arbitrator. This would certainly put the arbitrator in an
impossible position. Presumably he gave his best thought and judgment to his original award. Is he now to stultify himself by rendering
a new award which he does not really believe contains the proper
sanction? Suppose he had originally ordered a discharged employee
reinstated without back pay. The union appeals and the court decides
that the arbitrator's power was limited to an all-or-nothing award,
and directs a rehearing before the same arbitrator. Thereafter the
arbitrator concludes that, if he must choose between discharge and
reinstatement with full back pay, the former is less unfair to the employee than the latter would be to the employer, so he now issues
an award upholding the discharge. If his original decision had been
in favor of the company, this would have been clearly within his
authority, and the union might have accepted it without rancor. But
since his original decision was in favor of reinstatement, albeit without
back pay, and his present decision is in favor of discharge, although
the change was forced upon him by the action of the court, the union
is very likely to regard him as a vacillating heel!
I am not unmindful of the fact that the sentence in section 1 of the
proposed Act that extends the statute to labor arbitrations ends in
this fashion: "(unless otherwise provided in the agreement) ." The purpose of the parentheses is to indicate to state legislatures a feeling on
the part of the draftsmen that the clause in parentheses has an optional
character and might well be omitted, if the proposed Act should otherwise be adopted. If adopted without this clause, the proposed Act, if
constitutional, would so imperil the freedom of unions and employers to
tailor the use of arbitration to their own needs and desires that the parties would become extremely reluctant to subject themselves involuntarily to the provisions of the Act by entering into arbitration agreements. Instead of strengthening the process of labor arbitration, the
Act would have an inhibiting effect. If adopted with the clause in
parentheses, it can safely be predicted that the representatives of
unions and employers, in hereafter drafting arbitration provisions, will
consistently stipulate that the Act is not to be applicable. In this event,
the proposed Act would be rendered completely abortive, as section 20
thereof restricts its application to "agreements made subsequent to the
taking effect of this act."
The arbitration step in grievance procedures should be drafted with
more attention to possible contingencies, and if the proposed Act were
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adopted, undoubtedly the parties would formulate their labor arbitration agreements with much greater care in an effort to minimize the
impact of the Act upon their affairs. But this desirable by-product
would be more than offset by the many unavoidable burdensome and
inappropriate provisions of the Act.
Summary and Conclusions
So distinct are the functions of labor arbitration and of commercial
arbitration that a regulatory statute, drafted with commercial arbitration primarily in mind, is by the very nature of things inappropriate
for labor arbitration.
Labor arbitration is auxiliary to collective bargaining, and collective bargaining is an important part of the free enterprise system. Any
statutory invasion of the bargaining process should be suspect, until
it is conclusively demonstrated to subserve a paramount public
interest.
The proposed Uniform Arbitration Act interferes with the freedom
of the parties to a labor arbitration agreement to determine the selection of their arbitrator. It further undermines the completely voluntary nature of labor arbitration by authorizing courts to compel a
person to "arbitrate," although with respect to arbitration procedure
the minds of the disputants have not met. It enables judges, in the
guise of merely deciding a question of arbitrability, actually to determine the merits of the underlying substantive issue in dispute between
union and employer.
The proposed Act also hampers the labor arbitrator by surrounding
him with legalistic procedural requirements and it subverts his authority by empowering courts to vacate, modify or correct his awards.
If the proposed Act permits the parties to a labor arbitration agreement to provide that the Act shall not be applicable, the overwhelming
majority will virtually nullify the Act by so stipulating. Indeed, it
is not unlikely that many able, self-respecting arbitrators will refuse
to serve unless the arbitration agreement does so provide.
If the proposed Act is mandatory in its impact upon labor arbitration agreement, it will be of doubtful constitutionality and will discourage resort to labor arbitration. To the extent that it is applicable,
it will promote litigation, worsen labor relations, and encourage resort
to strikes and lock-outs; informed parties to labor arbitration agreements will include clauses preserving to each a right to retroactive
revocation and to strike or lock-out with respect to all matters not
submitted to arbitration.
The many procedural provisions of the proposed Act constitute an
entirely inappropriate effort to bring the institution of voluntary labor
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arbitration within the legal system of appeals and review, thereby destroying its essential character as a private forum for the final settlement of labor disputes within an industrial community.
A recent extensive survey reveals that failure to abide by the award
of a labor arbitrator is practically nil,9 and refusal to carry out an
agreement to arbitrate a labor dispute is undoubtedly even more rare.
No need has been shown for applying legislation such as the proposed
Uniform Arbitration Act to labor arbitration, and the long-range
interests of society will be best served, if this proposed Act is not
adopted.
9. Howard, supra note 1, at 20.

